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Mikael Mäkimattila (Aalto University) "The Design and Price of Certification (joint with Yucheng Shang and Ryo Shirakawa)" Abstract: We consider the design and pricing of certification contracts. A certifier offers a menu of tests to a sender, who holds partial private information about an unknown state and seeks to persuade a receiver. The selling […] |
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Toomas Hinnosaar (University of Nottingham) "Collusion without Patience" Abstract: Tacit collusion is usually linked to repeated interactions between patient firms. We show that it can also arise in a one-shot duopoly. When firms choose capacities and face outsourcing contracts with minimum order quantities, gaps in feasible outputs allow commitment not to sell intermediate quantities. For […] |
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Helene Mass (University of Vienna) "Socially optimal rating design" Face-to-face Seminar 15.2.71 - Room 15.1.39 |
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