Etiqueta: Seminario de Microeconomía
Fiscal rules as Bargaining Chips
Alessandro Riboni.
(Ecole Polytechnique).
Fiscal rules as Bargaining Chips.
Attendance confirmation.
Alessandro Riboni.
(Ecole Polytechnique).
Fiscal rules as Bargaining Chips.
Attendance confirmation.
Minimum Price Equilibrium in the Assignment Market
Don’t Sweat the Small Stuff
Chiara Margaria.
(Boston University).
Don’t Sweat the Small Stuff.
Abstract: Motivated by the study of household dynamics, we analyze a stochastic partnership model with a view to determining how the mean duration of the partnership depends on the distribution of the partners’ monetary earnings. Every period, the partners’ preferences for each other are revised stochastically, and the partners have the opportunity to choose to continue the relationship and renegotiate the allocation of their earning, or to part ways and permanently collect their autarky payoffs. Since the extent of such transfers is limited by the size of the partners’ earnings, the degree of effective transferability is determined both by the distribution of earnings and the nature of the shocks most likely to require compensation. We characterize equilibria of the infinitely repeated game with a fixed discount factor. The main result is that the expected duration of the partnership is decreasing in the inequality of monetary earnings if the shock distribution satisfies a monotone hazard rate condition.
Attendance confirmation.
Chiara Margaria.
(Boston University).
Don’t Sweat the Small Stuff.
Abstract: Motivated by the study of household dynamics, we analyze a stochastic partnership model with a view to determining how the mean duration of the partnership depends on the distribution of the partners’ monetary earnings. Every period, the partners’ preferences for each other are revised stochastically, and the partners have the opportunity to choose to continue the relationship and renegotiate the allocation of their earning, or to part ways and permanently collect their autarky payoffs. Since the extent of such transfers is limited by the size of the partners’ earnings, the degree of effective transferability is determined both by the distribution of earnings and the nature of the shocks most likely to require compensation. We characterize equilibria of the infinitely repeated game with a fixed discount factor. The main result is that the expected duration of the partnership is decreasing in the inequality of monetary earnings if the shock distribution satisfies a monotone hazard rate condition.
Attendance confirmation.
Voluntary Disclosure and Personalized Pricing
S. Nageeb Ali.
(Pensylvannia State University).
Voluntary Disclosure and Personalized Pricing.
Attendance confirmation.
S. Nageeb Ali.
(Pensylvannia State University).
Voluntary Disclosure and Personalized Pricing.
Attendance confirmation.
Partnership with Persistence
Matching with myopic and farsighted players
Ana Mauleon.
(Université Saint-Louis).
Matching with myopic and farsighted players.
Attendance confirmation.
Ana Mauleon.
(Université Saint-Louis).
Matching with myopic and farsighted players.
Attendance confirmation.
Nash bargaining with endogenous outside options
Causality: a decision theoretic approach
Pablo Schenone.
(Arizona State University).
Causality: a decision theoretic approach.
Attendance confirmation.
Pablo Schenone.
(Arizona State University).
Causality: a decision theoretic approach.
Attendance confirmation.
On Formal and Informal Insurance Markets under Altruistic Preferences
Outsourcing without Cost Advantages
Chrysovalantou Milliou.
(Athens University).
Outsourcing without Cost Advantages.
Attendance confirmation.
Chrysovalantou Milliou.
(Athens University).
Outsourcing without Cost Advantages.