Etiqueta: Seminario de Microeconomía

TBA

Martin Vaeth

(Paris School of Economics)

 

«TBA»

 

Face-to-face Seminar 15.2.71  – Room 15.1.39

On the Inefficiency of Social Learning

Florian Brandl

(University of Bonn)

 

«On the Inefficiency of Social Learning»

Abstract: We study whether a social planner can restore efficient learning a finite expected number of incorrect actions in the canonical sequential social learning model. Agents act in order, each choosing one of two actions based on a private signal and the social information they observe. The planner controls the social information disclosed to each agent and offers transfers contingent on the agent’s action. We show that whenever learning is inefficient without intervention, no combination of disclosure and transfers restores efficient learning at finite cost: the planner must offer subsidies approaching the full value of a correct decision to infinitely many agents, so the expected total offered transfer is infinite. In particular, no disclosure policy alone restores efficiency. Offered transfers, however, differ from realized payments: since a transfer is paid only when the agent takes the subsidized action, the planner can achieve efficient learning while keeping the expected total realized payment arbitrarily small.

 

Face-to-face Seminar 15.2.71  – Room 15.1.39

Collusion without Patience

Toomas Hinnosaar

(University of Nottingham)

 

«Collusion without Patience»

Abstract: Tacit collusion is usually linked to repeated interactions between patient firms. We show that it can also arise in a one-shot duopoly. When firms choose capacities and face outsourcing contracts with minimum order quantities, gaps in feasible outputs allow commitment not to sell intermediate quantities. For a range of parameters, there exists a collusive equilibrium in which both firms produce less and earn more than under competition. Three other equilibria can also arise: competitive, leadership, and miscoordination. We then extend the model to general two-sided limited commitment and show that it yields the same set of equilibria.

Face-to-face Seminar 15.2.71 – Room 15.1.39

Networks and Norms (joint with Matteo Marsili, Intentional Center of Theoretical Physics, Trieste)

Fernando Vega-Redondo

(Chinese University of Hong Kong)

 

«Networks and Norms (joint with Matteo Marsili, Intentional Center of Theoretical Physics, Trieste)»

ABSTRACT: The co-evolution of social networks and social norms gives rise to a wide range of dynamic behavior. For, as our model highlights, networks not only support the rise of new norms but also tend to block significant changes in established ones. This is why history often shows that, before prevailing norms can be dislodged, incumbent networks must erode. Over time, therefore, the evolution of norms tends to display long phases of slow change, sporadically punctuated by short periods of fast network adjustment in which new norms arise and then gain a robust foothold. Our theoretical framework, by accommodating different time scales, sheds light of how such a rise and fall of norms and networks unfold.

 

Room 15.1.39