Elena Shvartsman.
(WHU – Otto Beisheim School of Management).
Stress, Incentives, and Autonomy.
Etiqueta: Seminario de A&E
Stress, Incentives, and Autonomy
Global giants and local stars: How changes in brand ownership affect competition
Keith Head.
(Sauder School of Business).
«Global giants and local stars: How changes in brand ownership affect competition».
Virtual seminar – Enter the session through this link.
Keith Head.
(Sauder School of Business).
«Global giants and local stars: How changes in brand ownership affect competition».
Virtual seminar – Enter the session through this link.
First generation elite: the role of school networks
Emma Tominey
(University of York)
«First generation elite: the role of school networks»
Face-to-face seminar – Room 15.1.39
Emma Tominey
(University of York)
«First generation elite: the role of school networks»
Face-to-face seminar – Room 15.1.39
Correcting Endogeneity Bias in Models with Bunching
Carolina Caetano.
(University of Georgia).
Correcting Endogeneity Bias in Models with Bunching.
Attendance Confirmation.
Carolina Caetano.
(University of Georgia).
Correcting Endogeneity Bias in Models with Bunching.
Attendance Confirmation.
Explaining Recent Trends in US School Segregation
Gregorio Caetano.
(University of Georgia).
Explaining Recent Trends in US School Segregation.
Attendance Confirmation.
Gregorio Caetano.
(University of Georgia).
Explaining Recent Trends in US School Segregation.
Attendance Confirmation.
Inference for Ranks with Application to Intergenerational Mobility and Neighborhoods
Daniel Wilhelm.
(University College London).
«Inference for Ranks with Application to Intergenerational Mobility and Neighborhoods”.
Attendance Confirmation.
Daniel Wilhelm.
(University College London).
«Inference for Ranks with Application to Intergenerational Mobility and Neighborhoods”.
Attendance Confirmation.
Changing the incentive to pollute: Heterogeneous effects of waste pricing policies.
Marica Valente.
(DIW Berlin).
Changing the incentive to pollute: Heterogeneous effects of waste pricing policies.
Abstract
The externalities of household waste generation and treatment can be internalized with policies pricing unsorted waste disposal known as Pay-As-You-Throw (PAYT). To internalize pollution externalities of municipal waste, Pay-As-You-Throw (PAYT) pricing of unsorted waste are adopted worldwide. Using machine learning methods on a unique high-dimensional data panel of Italian municipalities, this paper estimates PAYT causal effects on municipal unsorted, recycling, and total waste heterogeneously with respect to a large set of municipal characteristics. I derive a household waste generation model that predicts effect heterogeneity, and I employ an R-learning random forest estimator that accounts for possibly endogenous adoption. Results show that PAYT is on average effective, decreasing unsorted waste per capita up to -60%, an effect driven by households preferring recycling (+41%) over total waste reduction. Both adoption and compliance are found to be heterogeneous in pre-policy waste levels, and explained by complex interactions of covariates. Continuous treatment analysis shows a modest and time-varying price elasticity of waste demands. Social costs savings are positive, and predicted to increase if all municipalities were to introduce the policy.
Attendance confirmation.
Marica Valente.
(DIW Berlin).
Changing the incentive to pollute: Heterogeneous effects of waste pricing policies.
Abstract
The externalities of household waste generation and treatment can be internalized with policies pricing unsorted waste disposal known as Pay-As-You-Throw (PAYT). To internalize pollution externalities of municipal waste, Pay-As-You-Throw (PAYT) pricing of unsorted waste are adopted worldwide. Using machine learning methods on a unique high-dimensional data panel of Italian municipalities, this paper estimates PAYT causal effects on municipal unsorted, recycling, and total waste heterogeneously with respect to a large set of municipal characteristics. I derive a household waste generation model that predicts effect heterogeneity, and I employ an R-learning random forest estimator that accounts for possibly endogenous adoption. Results show that PAYT is on average effective, decreasing unsorted waste per capita up to -60%, an effect driven by households preferring recycling (+41%) over total waste reduction. Both adoption and compliance are found to be heterogeneous in pre-policy waste levels, and explained by complex interactions of covariates. Continuous treatment analysis shows a modest and time-varying price elasticity of waste demands. Social costs savings are positive, and predicted to increase if all municipalities were to introduce the policy.
Attendance confirmation.
On Policy Evaluation with Aggregate Time-Series Shocks
Dmitry Arkhangelsky.
(CEMFI).
On Policy Evaluation with Aggregate Time-Series Shocks.
Attendance confirmation.
Dmitry Arkhangelsky.
(CEMFI).
On Policy Evaluation with Aggregate Time-Series Shocks.
Attendance confirmation.
Implications of Consumer Loyalty for Price Dynamics when Price Adjustment is Costly
Mateusz Mysliwski.
(NHH).
Implications of Consumer Loyalty for Price Dynamics when Price Adjustment is Costly.
Abstract:
We study the implications of consumer switching costs on prices when price adjustments are costly. Existing theoretical and empirical works on consumer switching costs assume firms can change prices freely without any supply side frictions. We develop a dynamic game-theoretic model in which consumers exhibit inertia in their choices and firms compete in prices while facing costly price adjustments. We use the model to analyse the UK butter and margarine industry and estimate it with a rich scanner data set. The adjustment costs in our model can be interpreted as promotional fees which dairy suppliers pay to supermarkets. We find that price adjustment costs are substantial and represent between 24-34% of manufacturers’ net margins. We show that ignoring price adjustment costs can lead to substantial underprediction of the effects of consumer switching costs on prices. Our model predicts that the removal of promotional fees reduces firm costs and increases their profits without passing down benefits to the consumers.
Attendance confirmation.
Mateusz Mysliwski.
(NHH).
Implications of Consumer Loyalty for Price Dynamics when Price Adjustment is Costly.
Abstract:
We study the implications of consumer switching costs on prices when price adjustments are costly. Existing theoretical and empirical works on consumer switching costs assume firms can change prices freely without any supply side frictions. We develop a dynamic game-theoretic model in which consumers exhibit inertia in their choices and firms compete in prices while facing costly price adjustments. We use the model to analyse the UK butter and margarine industry and estimate it with a rich scanner data set. The adjustment costs in our model can be interpreted as promotional fees which dairy suppliers pay to supermarkets. We find that price adjustment costs are substantial and represent between 24-34% of manufacturers’ net margins. We show that ignoring price adjustment costs can lead to substantial underprediction of the effects of consumer switching costs on prices. Our model predicts that the removal of promotional fees reduces firm costs and increases their profits without passing down benefits to the consumers.
Attendance confirmation.
Fast and Fair Simultaneous Confidence Bands for Functional Parameters
Dominik Liebl.
(University of Bonn).
Fast and Fair Simultaneous Confidence Bands for Functional Parameters.
Attendance confirmation.