Departamento de Economía Universidad Carlos III

TBA
2026-09-15 12:45 - 14:00 (Europe/Helsinki) | 15.1.39
Mikael Mäkimattila
(Aalto University)

«TBA»

Face-to-face Seminar 15.2.71 – Room 15.1.39

The Transition to Parenthood: The Effects of Fertility on Religious and Cultural Values (with Raphael Corbi and Natália Trigo)
2026-09-16 12:45 - 14:00
Francisco Costa
(FGV)

«The Transition to Parenthood: The Effects of Fertility on Religious and Cultural Values (with Raphael Corbi and Natália Trigo)»
This paper shows that the transition to parenthood shapes adults’ religious and social values. Using panel and pseudo-panel event-study designs for the United States and Europe, we document a persistent increase in religious engagement and traditionalist values following the birth of a first child. This shift is not merely a change in social participation (belonging) but also extends to private beliefs and identity (believing), suggesting an elasticity in deep-preference parameters that challenges the canonical assumption of adult preference stability. To assess the magnitude of these effects, we ask how much of the observed decline in religious engagement can be attributed to falling fertility. A counterfactual decomposition indicates that the secular decline in fertility accounts for, on average, 12.5 percent of secularization in the West over the past half-century.

Face to Face 15.2.71 – Room 15.1.39

TBA
2026-09-17 12:45 - 14:00
Benny Kleinman
(Stanford University)

«TBA»

Face to Face 15.2.71 – Room 15.1.39

Perceptions of Race in the Labor Market joint with Pedro C. Sant’Anna and Aiko Schmeisser
2026-09-21 12:45 - 14:00
Sulin Sardoschau
(Humboldt University)

«Perceptions of Race in the Labor Market joint with Pedro C. Sant’Anna and Aiko Schmeisser»

Face to Face 15.2.71 – Room 15.1.39

Collusion without Patience
2026-09-22 12:45 - 14:00
Toomas Hinnosaar
(University of Nottingham)

«Collusion without Patience»
Abstract: Tacit collusion is usually linked to repeated interactions between patient firms. We show that it can also arise in a one-shot duopoly. When firms choose capacities and face outsourcing contracts with minimum order quantities, gaps in feasible outputs allow commitment not to sell intermediate quantities. For a range of parameters, there exists a collusive equilibrium in which both firms produce less and earn more than under competition. Three other equilibria can also arise: competitive, leadership, and miscoordination. We then extend the model to general two-sided limited commitment and show that it yields the same set of equilibria.

Face-to-face Seminar 15.2.71 – Room 15.1.39

TBA
2026-09-23 12:45 - 14:00
Timo Dimitriadis
(University Frankfurt)
«TBA»

Face to Face 15.2.71 – Room 15.1.39

TBA
2026-09-24 12:45 - 14:00
Maarten De Ridder
(LSE)

«TBA»

Face to Face 15.2.71 – Room 15.1.39

Deforestation as an Option: Land Grabbing in the Brazilian Amazon
2026-09-28 12:45 - 14:00
Rodrigo R. Soares
(INSPER)

«Deforestation as an Option: Land Grabbing in the Brazilian Amazon»

Face to Face 15.2.71 – Room 15.1.39

TBA
2026-09-29 12:45 - 14:00
Helene Mass
(University of Vienna)

«TBA»

Face-to-face Seminar 15.2.71 – Room 15.1.39

Tail Index Regression for Extremal Dependence” (joint work with Paulo M. M. Rodrigues from Banco de Portugal and NOVA School of Business and Economics)
2026-09-30 12:45 - 14:00
Yannick Hoga
(Universität Duisburg-Essen)

«Tail Index Regression for Extremal Dependence” (joint work with Paulo M. M. Rodrigues from Banco de Portugal and NOVA School of Business and Economics)»

Face to Face 15.2.71 – Room 15.1.39

TBA
2026-10-01 12:45 - 14:00
Julian Neira
(University of Exeter)

«TBA»

Face to Face 15.2.71 – Room 15.1.39
