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DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Helsinki:20260915T124500
DTEND;TZID=Europe/Helsinki:20260915T140000
DTSTAMP:20260908T075038Z
CREATED:20260714T112635Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20260908T075038Z
UID:10772-1789476300-1789480800@economia.uc3m.es
SUMMARY:The Design and Price of Certification (joint with Yucheng Shang and Ryo Shirakawa)
DESCRIPTION:Mikael Mäkimattila\n(Aalto University)\n  \n«The Design and Price of Certification (joint with Yucheng Shang and Ryo Shirakawa)»\n\nAbstract: We consider the design and pricing of certification contracts. A certifier offers a menu of tests to a sender\, who holds partial private information about an unknown state and seeks to persuade a receiver.  The selling mechanism gives information to the receiver through two channels: the actual informativeness of the tests and the sender’s choice. In the revenue-maximizing menu\, senders whose beliefs exceed an upper threshold purchase a common test\, while senders whose beliefs fall below a lower threshold purchase no test. Those with intermediate beliefs purchase distinct tests\, so test choice perfectly reveals the sender’s private information. All sender types who purchase a test are indifferent across all options in the menu\, and the receiver obtains zero surplus. We also analyze how the results change if the certifier can conceal which test the sender selects.\n\nFace-to-face Seminar 15.2.71  – Room 15.1.39
URL:https://economia.uc3m.es/event/tba-190/
LOCATION:15.1.39
CATEGORIES:Seminario de Microeconomía
ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://economia.uc3m.es/wp-content/uploads/2026/07/makimattila_portrait-e1784028335551.jpg
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DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Helsinki:20260922T124500
DTEND;TZID=Europe/Helsinki:20260922T140000
DTSTAMP:20260714T120105Z
CREATED:20260714T120105Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20260714T120105Z
UID:10788-1790081100-1790085600@economia.uc3m.es
SUMMARY:Collusion without Patience
DESCRIPTION:Toomas Hinnosaar\n(University of Nottingham)\n  \n«Collusion without Patience»\nAbstract: Tacit collusion is usually linked to repeated interactions between patient firms. We show that it can also arise in a one-shot duopoly. When firms choose capacities and face outsourcing contracts with minimum order quantities\, gaps in feasible outputs allow commitment not to sell intermediate quantities. For a range of parameters\, there exists a collusive equilibrium in which both firms produce less and earn more than under competition. Three other equilibria can also arise: competitive\, leadership\, and miscoordination. We then extend the model to general two-sided limited commitment and show that it yields the same set of equilibria. \n\nFace-to-face Seminar 15.2.71 – Room 15.1.39
URL:https://economia.uc3m.es/event/collusion-without-patience/
LOCATION:15.1.39
CATEGORIES:Seminario de Microeconomía
ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://economia.uc3m.es/wp-content/uploads/2026/07/images-e1784030424660.jpg
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DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Helsinki:20260929T124500
DTEND;TZID=Europe/Helsinki:20260929T140000
DTSTAMP:20260728T090918Z
CREATED:20260714T124240Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20260728T090918Z
UID:10804-1790685900-1790690400@economia.uc3m.es
SUMMARY:Socially optimal rating design
DESCRIPTION:Helene Mass\n(University of Vienna)\n  \n«Socially optimal rating design»\n  \nFace-to-face Seminar 15.2.71 – Room 15.1.39
URL:https://economia.uc3m.es/event/tba-196/
LOCATION:15.1.39
CATEGORIES:Seminario de Microeconomía
ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://economia.uc3m.es/wp-content/uploads/2026/07/unnamed-3-e1784032928511.jpg
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