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BEHIND THE SUPPORT FOR REDISTRIBUTIVE POLITICS: SOCIAL PREFERENCES OR BELIEFS?

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Abstract

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Behind the support for redistributive politics: Social preferences or beliefs?

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July 15, 2024

Abstract

In this paper we explore how individual social preferences correlate with political support for redistribution. We ran an incentivized experiment with a large representative sample of the Spanish population. Our participants took six decisions that elicited their social preferences. Their choices could result in a different total surplus and different distributions of the surplus between the subject and an anonymous counterpart. In our sample, social preferences are unrelated to political support for distributive policies. The main correlates for support of redistribution are the beliefs concerning the importance of effort versus luck for success (*fairness*), the trust in government institutions (*effectiveness*) and the perceived importance of the poverty problem (*need*).

Keywords: Elicitation of social preferences, Income distribution and politics, Trust in government institutions.

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1 Introduction

In this paper we elicit social preferences in distributional problems for a large representative sample. Our contribution is twofold. First, we characterize preferences on distributional issues, information that could be useful for the design of policies that aggregate individual preferences of citizens. Second, we test the hypothesis that these underlying social preferences are behind the political support for redistributive policies.

Political platforms usually contain economic proposals that affect the distribution of income, and citizens have preferences defined over these proposals that may be expressed at elections or in the political debate. It is not uncommon that economic policies face a trade-off between efficiency and equity. Policies that help reduce inequality may reduce efficiency. For example, more generous unemployment benefits may reduce incentives to work. Other policies could improve efficiency by reducing distortions (tax distortions, for instance), but are often bad for equity. Individuals may prefer policies that offer less inequality even though they are less efficient. Or they may prefer the opposite, more efficient policies at the cost of higher inequality. Social preferences (such as altruism or inequality aversion) may also lead individuals to prefer more progressive taxes even when it implies that their personal tax burden will be higher.

The main question we address in this paper is whether social preferences are the main driver of the support for redistribution. This may not be the case if, for example, the general opinion is that *people with less resources could improve their situation by putting in more effort*. Then, even with altruistic social preferences, they may not support redistribution because they perceive it as unfair. Another instance in which support for redistribution would be weak, even with altruistic social preferences, is when *citizens do not trust government institutions*, that is, they are not confident that the political process will be able to redistribute appropriately the collected taxes. Finally, distributive policies would not be supported if they are not needed, that is, if *people think poverty is not a problem*. In sum, support for redistribution would require not only social preferences but also *fairness*,

effectiveness, and *need* of such policies.

We explore the main drivers of support by eliciting social preferences and other variables related to the fairness, effectiveness and need of distributive policies. The support for redistribution is measured in two ways. First, through the political attitude: left-wing is interpreted as more supportive of redistribution than right-wing. Second, the survey also elicits the support for government intervention in the economy to improve distribution. Specifically, the question is stated as: “The State should take measures to reduce differences in income levels.”

In our experimental survey, the participants, who are representative of the Spanish population, take six incentivized decisions. Each time they have to decide between two alternative proposals: an equal and an unequal division. Each proposal may result in a different total surplus and also in a different distribution of the surplus between the subject and an anonymous counterpart. We use the individual choices to place the participants into one of four categories: altruistic, spiteful, egalitarian, and inequality-averse, derived from [Fehr and Schmidt \(1999\)](#)’s model. We also elicited the beliefs on *fairness* (importance of effort versus luck for success), *effectiveness* (trust in government institutions) and *need* (prevalence of poverty) of redistributive policies, to check whether these variables modulate the relationship between social preferences and support for redistribution.

We first look at individual characteristics, socio-demographic and other traits, in the population, to see whether they are associated to preferences for distributional issues. For instance, older generations may be more or less supportive for redistribution depending on how they are affected by such policies (social transfers, taxes) and their life experience concerning their effectiveness.

Second, we look at the relationship between social preferences, beliefs and the individual political attitudes. The support for redistribution requires not only social preferences, but also the belief that the institutions will be able to carry out redistribution effectively and that redistribution is needed and fair. We analyze in our sample the relative importance of social preferences and beliefs for the political attitude of subjects, which is

an indirect measure of their support for redistribution, as well as their direct support for State intervention in distribution.

The hypothesis that the underlying social preferences of subjects are behind their support for redistributive policies is not supported by the data. Rather, we find that the main drivers for redistributive policy support are the beliefs concerning the effectiveness, fairness and need of such policies.

The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 contains the relevant literature and our contribution. Sections 3 and 4 describe the experimental design and the data. The results are presented in Section 5 and Section 6 offers some concluding remarks.

2 Related literature

There is some recent literature on the relationship between social preferences and political attitudes. In an online experiment on a large heterogeneous sample (German Internet Panel, GIP), [Kerschbamer and Müller \(2020\)](#) find that selfish subjects are less inclined to favor redistribution and more likely to vote for a right-wing party. They conclude that distributional preferences help to understand political outcomes. [Müller and Renes \(2021\)](#) conclude that individual characteristics matter for social preferences (females are more egalitarian and males more efficiency oriented) and that left-wing voters are more likely to be egalitarian while right-wing voters are more likely to be efficiency-seekers.

[Fisman et al. \(2017\)](#) also find a relationship between underlying preferences and political outcomes. In a US sample, they conclude that equality-focused subjects are more likely to have voted for Barack Obama in 2012, and to be affiliated with the Democratic Party. [Fisman et al. \(2023\)](#) document that the distributional preferences of Americans in 2013-2016 were stable in the period and that subjects who experienced an increase in income became more self-interested.

Using the results of several national plebiscites on redistributive policies in Switzerland, [Epper et al. \(2020\)](#) find that social preferences (inequality aversion and altruism) are strongly related to support for redistribution

particularly for affluent individuals.

We contribute to this literature with the idea that social preferences may be a necessary condition for the support to redistribution, but it is not sufficient: support also requires beliefs on the effectiveness, fairness and need of such policies. This is consistent with previous results in the literature; for example, [Epper et al. \(2020\)](#) report that for selfish individuals, meritocratic beliefs are unrelated to support for redistribution, while these beliefs are highly relevant for altruistic and egalitarian individuals. We test this idea in a representative sample of the Spanish population. We do not find a clear-cut relationship between social preferences and political orientation. We conclude that social preferences are not sufficient for the support of redistributive policies, beliefs on the effectiveness, fairness and need of the policies are main drivers of their support.

3 Experimental Design

The experimental survey was run in June 2021.¹ In addition to the decisions about distribution, the participants were tested with standard measures to evaluate their risk attitudes and time preferences. They also answered a socioeconomic questionnaire that included questions on beliefs and political orientation.

3.1 Distributional preferences: Mini-DGs

Following [Corgnet et al. \(2015\)](#), in this study we elicit *social preferences* with 6 mini-dictator games. The decisions were incentivized and one of them was randomly selected for payment. After a brief introduction,² subjects made the 6 decisions sequentially. In all decisions the recipient was anonymous and the 6 choices appeared in random order on the screen.

Figure 1 shows an example of a decision task.³ In this case, the subject

¹This study was conducted jointly with [Brañas-Garza et al. \(2022\)](#), using the same sample.

²Instructions in English are provided at the end of this document.

³Figure 1, translation from Spanish: Please, choose one of the two options (A or B):

has to choose between A: (1€, 1€) and B: (0.8€, 1.6€). Note that option B is more efficient (the total amount is 2.4€), but also more unequal and the decision maker gets a lower amount. The remaining 5 decisions are similar, with the decision maker facing a different trade-off in each case.

Figure 1: Dictator game: Decision screen (example)



Table 1 contains all the decision tasks with the dictator and recipient's payoffs, x_d and x_r respectively, for each option. We also include envy/compassion parameters (see section 4.1) and, in the last three columns, distributional effects and variation of the total surplus.

-
- A: 1€ for you / 1€ for the other person
 - B: 0.8€ for you / 1.6€ for the other person.

Table 1: Decision and envy/compassion parameters

	Option A	Envy/comp.	Option B	Envy/comp.			
	(x_d, x_r)	parameters	(x_d, x_r)	parameters	Δx_d	Δx_r	$\Delta surplus$
Decision 1	(1, 1)	$\alpha > -0.125$	(0.8, 1.6)	$\alpha < -0.25$	-0.2	0.6	0.4
Decision 2	(1, 1)	$\beta > 0.25$	(1.2, 0.4)	$\beta < 0 - 25$	0.2	-0.6	-0.4
Decision 3	(1, 1)	$\beta > 0$	(1, 0.6)	$\beta < 0$	0	-0.4	-0.4
Decision 4	(1, 1)	$\beta > 0.5$	(1.6, 0.4)	$\beta < 0.5$	0.6	-0.6	0
Decision 5	(1, 1)	$\alpha > 0$	(1, 1.8)	$\alpha < 0$	0	0.8	0.8
Decision 6	(1, 1)	$\alpha > 0.125$	(1.1, 1.9)	$\alpha < 0.125$	0.1	0.9	1.0

Individuals' choices will depend on how they solve the trade-offs involved in the different decisions, which in turn depends on their social preferences. Here is a list of their potential motivations:

- *Altruism*: decision maximizes the recipient's payoff.
- *Spitefulness*: decision minimizes the recipient's payoff.
- *Egalitarianism*: decision minimizes payoff inequality.
- *Inequality-seeking*: decision maximizes payoff inequality.

Each choice in the 6 decision tasks is consistent with one or more of these individual motivations. For example, in Decision 1 the participants had to decide between A:(1€, 1€) and B:(0.8€, 1.6€), that is, they chose whether or not to increase the recipient's payoff and total surplus at the expense of their own payoff. Choosing option B in Decision 1 is consistent with altruism, as well as with inequality seeking. In Table S3 in appendix A.2 we include the potential motivations to choose option B for the 6 decisions.

3.2 Additional tasks

We also elicited additional information of potential relevance (see Table S2 in appendix A.1 for more detail). In particular, the participants completed the following tasks:

- Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT), [Frederick \(2005\)](#). This test allows to distinguish between 2 types of subjects’ cognitive styles: reflective and impulsive, which could affect decisions. Individuals respond to three questions with an impulsive-incorrect answer and with a reflective-correct answer. *CRT* variable is defined as the number of correct answers in the three questions.
- Non-incentivized time preferences test.⁴ Patient people prefer larger rewards in the future to smaller ones closer in time. Patience is measured using a multiple price list with six items of two options. The first option is always the same ”collect tomorrow 100 euros”. In the second options the waiting time for collection is one month and the amount increases by 10 euros from the first item (100 euros) to the sixth one (150 euros). We define *Patience* as the number of times the respondent chooses to wait (option 2).
- Maths. Two questions about skills performing division calculations and interest rates are included in the questionnaire. We define *Math* variable as the number of correct answers on both questions.

3.3 Sociodemographics

In addition to the previous tasks, subjects completed a socio-demographic questionnaire. Among other questions, participants provided information about age, gender, education, marital status, number of children in the household, household income, profession, religion, political preferences, social attitudes, parental socioeconomic status, meritocratic beliefs (*fairness*), trust in government institutions (*effectiveness*), and prevalence of poverty (*need*). See Table [S2](#) in appendix [A.1](#) for more detail.

⁴A recent study shows that monetary incentives do not affect elicited time preferences, see [Brañas-Garza et al. \(2023\)](#).

4 Data and sample

We ran a survey-experiment (conducted by ASU Research) in a sample of 1,500 individuals. It was a representative sample of the Spanish population. On average subjects earned 5.16€.

Due to missing values in some of the variables used in the study, the total sample was reduced to 1,368 individuals.

4.1 Social preferences' categorization

If we assume that the utility derived by individual i from the payoff vector (x_i, x_j) follows the basic specification of the inequality-aversion model of [Fehr and Schmidt \(1999\)](#) for the two-person case, utility is given by

$$U_i(x_i, x_j) = x_i - \alpha_i \max\{x_j - x_i, 0\} - \beta_i \max\{x_i - x_j, 0\} \quad (1)$$

where α_i is the envy parameter and measures individual i 's aversion to disadvantageous inequality, while β_i is the compassion parameter and measures individual i 's aversion to advantageous inequality.

Preferences, and therefore decisions, will depend on the sign and value of α_i and/or β_i . According to these parameters, individuals' motivations can be characterized as follows:

- *Altruism*: $\alpha_i \leq 0$ and $\beta_i \geq 0$ with at least one strict inequality.
- *Spitefulness*: $\alpha_i \geq 0$ and $\beta_i \leq 0$ with at least one strict inequality.
- *Egalitarianism*: $\alpha_i \geq 0$ and $\beta_i \geq 0$ with at least one strict inequality.
- *Inequality-seeking*: $\alpha_i \leq 0$ and $\beta_i \leq 0$ with at least one strict inequality.

Following [Corgnet et al. \(2015\)](#), we can infer the envy/compassion parameters associated to choices A and B in each of the six mini-dictator games (see Table 1). Individuals are then categorized according to all possible combinations of the envy (α) and compassion (β) parameters in [Fehr and Schmidt \(1999\)](#) model.

Figure S1 (in appendix A.3) displays the number of subjects classified according to each combination of α (column) and β (row) and the corresponding social preferences.

To ensure the robustness of the results, individuals have been classified according to the parameters of envy and compassion independently. Table 2 provides this classification. Individuals classified as *inconsistent* are those with contradictory responses in terms of α and β .

Table 2: Distribution of α and β

α	Frequency	β	Frequency
Inconsistent	110 (8.0%)	Inconsistent	122 (8.9%)
$\alpha < -0.25$	73 (5.3%)	$\beta < 0$	85 (6.2%)
$-0.25 < \alpha < 0$	245 (17.9%)	$0 < \beta < 0.25$	139 (10.2%)
$0 < \alpha < 0.125$	130 (9.5%)	$0.25 < \beta < 0.5$	100 (7.3%)
$0.125 < \alpha$	810 (59.2%)	$0.5 < \beta$	922 (67.4%)
	1368 (100%)		1368 (100%)

5 Results

In this section we present our main results. Subsection 5.1 shows the relationship between social preferences and sociodemographic characteristics, subsection 5.2 explores support to redistribution and political orientation and subsection 5.3 focuses on beliefs. In Table S1 in appendix A.1, we report summary statistics of the variables used in our study; see also Table S2 for the definition of the variables.

Note that in all regression tables, *** corresponds to a p-value $p < 0.001$, ** to $p < 0.01$ and * to $p < 0.05$; results for $0.05 < p < 0.1$ are not reported.

5.1 Personal characteristics and social preferences

Table 3 shows the estimated regression for each behavioral type in our sample (*Egalitarianism*, *Altruism*, *Spite* and *Inequality-Seeking*) and for α and

β . In these last regressions inconsistent individuals have been removed (see Table 2).

The columns on the left of Table 3 focus on the four behavioral types. *Egalitarianism* is associated to individuals over the age of 65 ($p < 0.001$), impatient ($p < 0.001$), women ($p < 0.01$), couples ($p < 0.01$), and those with no managerial position or liberal profession ($p < 0.05$). *Altruism* is primarily found among reflective ($p < 0.001$) and patient individuals ($p < 0.001$), men ($p < 0.05$), individuals with mathematical skills ($p < 0.05$), managers or independent professionals ($p < 0.05$), and singles ($p < 0.05$). In the case of *Spite*, this type is less frequent among those over 45 ($p < 0.05$) or 65 ($p < 0.05$), or among reflective individuals ($p < 0.05$), but it does appear among the more religious ($p < 0.05$). Finally, *Inequality-Seeking* people are not proficient in mathematics ($p < 0.001$) and are predominantly men ($p < 0.05$).

The right columns of Table 3 focus on Envy, α , and Solidarity, β - see the utility function (1). *Envy* (α) is common among the impatient ($p < 0.001$), the impulsive ($p < 0.001$) and those over 65 ($p < 0.05$). It is less common among men ($p < 0.01$) and managers and independent professionals ($p < 0.05$).

Solidarity (β) is correlated with mathematical skills at the 5% level. It clearly increases with age ($p < 0.001$): young people have less solidarity, while those over 65 have more. Additionally, men have less solidarity than women ($p < 0.001$).

To conclude this section, it is worth noting some variables that surprisingly have nothing to do with social preferences. The most striking are undoubtedly income, having been raised in an affluent neighborhood and the level of education. Religion also plays a very marginal role. In sum, from the sociodemographic information it is not easy to predict who will be altruistic, egalitarian, inequity seeker or spiteful.

Table 3: Regression results on preference types

	<i>Egalitarianism</i>	<i>Altruism</i>	<i>Spite</i>	<i>Ineq. Seeking</i>	α	β
Age ≤ 25	Ref	Ref	Ref	Ref	Ref	Ref
(25-45]	0.278 (0.209)	-0.127 (0.227)	-0.502 (0.341)	-0.067 (0.410)	0.165 (0.219)	0.671** (0.237)
(45-65]	0.488* (0.219)	-0.239 (0.242)	-0.750* (0.349)	-0.247 (0.437)	0.409 (0.235)	1.105*** (0.249)
> 65	1.008*** (0.302)	-0.558 (0.339)	-1.256* (0.575)	-1.836 (1.070)	0.707* (0.315)	1.066*** (0.320)
Male	-0.349** (0.124)	0.299* (0.140)	-0.079 (0.232)	0.534* (0.269)	-0.374** (0.137)	-0.404** (0.155)
Education (above secondary)	-0.091 (0.134)	0.123 (0.149)	0.153 (0.245)	-0.185 (0.298)	0.094 (0.144)	-0.251 (0.155)
Living as a couple	0.370** (0.137)	-0.301* (0.152)	-0.201 (0.257)	-0.286 (0.305)	0.087 (0.151)	0.093 (0.168)
Children in household	-0.151 (0.081)	0.116 (0.089)	0.094 (0.133)	0.132 (0.168)	-0.099 (0.089)	-0.112 (0.095)
Household income > 1400	-0.162 (0.131)	0.112 (0.144)	-0.013 (0.232)	0.377 (0.306)	0.099 (0.136)	-0.075 (0.152)
Management/indep. professional	-0.330* (0.145)	0.310* (0.156)	0.239 (0.243)	-0.123 (0.361)	-0.400* (0.156)	-0.110 (0.174)
Religion	-0.136 (0.123)	-0.114 (0.138)	0.453* (0.218)	0.385 (0.264)	0.191 (0.138)	0.197 (0.156)
Rich neighborhood	0.011 (0.019)	-0.008 (0.022)	-0.061 (0.035)	0.064 (0.039)	0.011 (0.022)	-0.019 (0.023)
CRT	-0.084 (0.067)	0.252*** (0.075)	-0.293* (0.128)	-0.188 (0.157)	-0.332*** (0.074)	0.023 (0.083)
Math	0.041 (0.093)	0.217* (0.106)	-0.106 (0.170)	-0.865*** (0.221)	-0.079 (0.108)	0.241* (0.119)
Patience	-0.149*** (0.028)	0.153*** (0.032)	0.047 (0.054)	0.057 (0.052)	-0.150*** (0.031)	-0.057 (0.034)
Observations	1368	1368	1368	1368	1159	1159

Standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Egalitarian-Ineq. seeker: Logit regression models

 α , β : Ordered logit regression models

5.2 Who supports redistributive political platforms?

In this section we try to determine whether there is a relationship between social preferences and support for redistribution; the intuition is that more generous or more egalitarian subjects would be in favor of a redistribution from the rich to the poor. On the other hand, support for redistribution would require beliefs on the effectiveness, fairness and need of such policies.

Concerning beliefs, we hypothesize that individuals support political platforms with less redistribution (right-wing political parties) when they do not trust the institutions that are in charge of redistribution, or when they believe that the actual income distribution is due to personal effort and therefore it is not fair to correct it, or when they do not perceive poverty as a pressing problem. More precisely, this hypothesis states that support for redistribution is affected by the variables: meritocratic beliefs (*fairness*), trust in institutions (*effectiveness*) and poverty prevalence (*need*).

Fairness: People's beliefs may put more weight on the importance of family background, social contacts or simply luck; or, alternatively, they may consider that what matters most is hard work, education and professional worth. We measure these beliefs with a variable in a scale of 1 to 10, where 1 is mostly luck and 10 is mostly effort; the question is: *How much do you think personal effort influences the economic position achieved by people in Spain?*

The variable *effectiveness* measures the degree of trust in government institutions (central, regional and local governments). The variable is obtained as the sum of the answers to these three questions: *To what extent do you think you can trust local/autonomous/national government institutions?*, where 1 is very little and 10 is very much.

Lastly, the variable *need* shows the relevance of poverty as a social problem for the respondent. We use a dichotomous variable that is equal to 1 when the individual answers "Poverty, lack of food and drinking water" to this question: *In your opinion, which of the following do you consider to be the most serious problem currently facing the world as a whole?*

To explore whether the support for redistribution is related with the individual's beliefs concerning the redistribution process itself, we estimate

two complementary models. First, we look at how *Political Views* - right-wing or left-wing in a scale 1 to 10 - are related to beliefs. Then, we analyze the relation between the variable *Support for State Interventions* - specifically, the question asks the degree of agreement with the statement “the State should take measures to reduce differences in income levels” - and beliefs. Results are in table 4. The first two columns focus on *Political Views*. The last 2 columns focus on *State Intervention*. The first and third columns use the types defined before while the second and fourth ones use economic preferences, α and β .

About political views, the *Inequality Seeking* people – a small group with 66 subjects (< 5% of the sample) – tend to vote for the right while the other types are indistinguishable from the reference group (*Egalitarianism*). Neither envy, α , nor solidarity, β , correlate with political orientation. Therefore, excluding that small group of inequality seekers, the types or preferences do not predict the vote for the right.

However, beliefs are highly relevant. Support for the right is positively related to *Fairness* ($p < 0.001$). And, as expected, negatively related to *Effectiveness* in charge of redistribution ($p < 0.001$), and to *Need* ($p < 0.001$). In short, social preferences are not useful to predict political attitudes, but beliefs are. Subjects with meritocratic beliefs tend to vote right as do those with less trust on institutions and less aware of the importance of poverty.

Another very strong predictor of right-wing voting is religion, as both the first and second column models show that the effect of religion is highly positive and significant ($p < 0.001$). There are other strong predictors in both models as well, such as being male ($p < 0.01$). Having been raised in an affluent neighborhood also influences right-wing voting. Lastly, age seems to have a small negative impact (in the first column model it is significant at 5%). Neither CRT nor patience are related to support for the right.

Whether an individual supports right-wing politics is an indirect measure of support for less redistributive policies. A more direct measure is the variable *Support to State Intervention*, that, as already explained, collects the agreement of the subjects with the statement: “*The State should take measures to reduce differences in income levels*” (from 1 to 10).

Table 4 (last two columns) explores the determinants of *State Intervention Support*. Results clearly show that neither behavioural types (*Egalitarianism*, *Altruism*, *Spite* and *Inequality Seeking*) nor social preferences (α and β) correlate with support for intervention. However, beliefs matter. Citizens with meritocratic beliefs (*Fairness*) do not support intervention ($p < 0.01$ and $p < 0.001$, in the two regressions). On the contrary, those who trust government institutions (*Effectiveness*, $p < 0.01$) and care more about poverty (*Need*, $p < 0.001$ and $p < 0.01$) are more likely to support state intervention.

Interestingly, we observe that richer ($p < 0.001$) and more religious citizens ($p < 0.001$ and $p < 0.05$) are less supportive of redistribution. There is a positive effect of impatience ($p < 0.001$ and $p < 0.01$) and impulsivity ($p < 0.01$). We also find, although only for the first model and only at the 5% significance level, that older individuals, those living in couples, and those raised in affluent neighborhoods tend to vote for the right.

Therefore, we conclude that social preferences are essentially unrelated in the data to support for redistribution, whereas beliefs about the *Effectiveness*, *Fairness* and *Need* of redistribution matter a lot. A subject may be egalitarian or altruist but if she distrusts government institutions, holds meritocratic beliefs or does not think that poverty is a pressing problem, then we expect the subject to have right-wing political attitudes and not to support state intervention to reduce inequality (Table 4).

In sum, beliefs are more important to predict support for redistribution than the utility function parameters that measure social preferences. The logical next step is to analyze what determines people’s beliefs about the *Effectiveness* (institutional trust), *Fairness* (meritocracy) and *Need* (prevalence of poverty). The following section examines this question.

Table 4: Support for redistribution

	<i>Political Views-Right</i>		<i>State Intervention</i>	
Egalitarianism	Ref		Ref	
Altruism	0.093 (0.140)		-0.055 (0.133)	
Spite	0.091 (0.245)		0.288 (0.225)	
Inequality Seeking	1.334*** (0.264)		-0.181 (0.241)	
α		-0.105 (0.068)		0.005 (0.067)
β		-0.141 (0.076)		0.136* (0.069)
Fairness	0.205*** (0.031)	0.206*** (0.033)	-0.091** (0.031)	-0.112*** (0.032)
Effectiveness	-0.047*** (0.010)	-0.053*** (0.011)	0.030** (0.010)	0.028** (0.011)
Need	-0.443*** (0.129)	-0.455** (0.141)	0.492*** (0.120)	0.446*** (0.130)
Age	-0.009* (0.005)	-0.009 (0.05)	0.092* (0.004)	0.006 (0.005)
Male	0.354** (0.124)	0.400** (0.138)	0.010 (0.117)	0.102 (0.129)
Education (above secondary)	0.080 (0.132)	0.070 (0.145)	-0.210 (0.117)	-0.154 (0.129)
Living as a couple	0.036 (0.137)	0.079 (0.151)	0.269* (0.129)	0.239 (0.141)
Children in household	0.109 (0.082)	0.117 (0.092)	0.001 (0.075)	-0.023 (0.084)
Household income above 1400	-0.077 (0.130)	-0.080 (0.143)	-0.557*** (0.120)	-0.611*** (0.130)

(continue next page)

Support for redistribution (continue)

	<i>Political Views-Right</i>		<i>State Intervention</i>	
Management/ind. professional	0.031 (0.145)	-0.081 (0.160)	0.112 (0.131)	0.113 (0.144)
Religion	1.303*** (0.127)	1.331*** (0.138)	-0.461*** (0.122)	-0.330* (0.130)
Rich neighborhood	0.055* (0.022)	0.053* (0.023)	0.050* (0.022)	0.030 (0.023)
CRT	-0.031 (0.067)	-0.014 (0.074)	-0.195** (0.062)	-0.192** (0.067)
Math	0.006 (0.094)	0.006 (0.103)	-0.126 (0.085)	-0.238* (0.093)
Patience	-0.033 (0.029)	-0.030 (0.031)	-0.096*** (0.026)	-0.081** (0.028)
Observations	1368	1159	1368	1159

Standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$
Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression models

5.3 What determines beliefs?

Table 5 shows the relationship between beliefs and sociodemographic variables as well as the behavioral types and social preferences parameters α and β .

Neither behavioral types nor social preferences have any relationship with *Fairness* (Table 5, columns 1-2). We find that religious people ($p < 0.001$) and those raised in an affluent neighbourhood ($p < 0.001$ and $p < 0.01$) tend to hold meritocratic beliefs, as well as those with higher earnings ($p < 0.01$ and $p < 0.05$) and those living in a couple ($p < 0.05$). There is a negative effect of *CRT* ($p < 0.05$ only on the first model) and *Maths* ($p < 0.05$ and $p < 0.01$). Interestingly, there is no connection with education.

Predicting why certain individuals trust government institutions (*Effec-*

tiveness) while others do not is not straightforward. Table 5 (columns 3-4) does not offer clear answers. Behavioural types have no impact – except *Inequality Seeking* people who strongly trust institutions ($p < 0.001$) – and the same holds for social preferences. Those who were raised in an affluent neighbourhood, more religious or with higher earnings, have more trust ($p < 0.001$, $p < 0.01$ and $p < 0.05$, respectively). Interestingly, reflective individuals are less likely to trust the government ($p < 0.01$ and $p < 0.05$).

Finally, Table 5 (columns 5-6) examines the beliefs on the *Need* for redistribution. As we can see, neither the behavioral types nor the social preferences parameters are significant, although one could expect that *altruistic* or *compassionate* individuals (β) would consider poverty a priority. Among the sociodemographic variables, only the level of education is significant ($p < 0.05$). The model indicates that more educated individuals do not believe that poverty is the most serious problem.

6 Conclusions

We run an experiment on a representative sample to study the connection between social preferences, beliefs and the support for redistribution.

Although both Fisman et al. (2017) and Kerschbamer and Müller (2020) or Müller and Renes (2021) find that social preferences are connected with voting direction, our experiment does not find anything similar for Spain. Nor do we find the result of Epper et al. (2020) that social preferences predict support for redistributive policies. In contrast to previous studies, our results indicate that beliefs matter and social preferences do not.

We find that social preferences are essentially unrelated to political attitudes or the support of state intervention toward redistribution. However, the beliefs on the fairness, the need and the effectiveness of redistribution are important determinants of the support for redistributive policies.

Table 5: What determine beliefs?

	Fairness		Effectiveness		Need	
Egalitarianism	Ref		Ref		Ref	
Altruism	-0.197		0.671		0.147	
	(0.129)		(0.405)		(0.147)	
Spite	-0.392		0.071		-0.312	
	(0.238)		(0.724)		(0.263)	
Inequality Seeking	-0.138		3.157***		-0.296	
	(0.247)		(0.801)		(0.319)	
α		0.050		-0.341		-0.089
		(0.065)		(0.215)		(0.072)
β		0.001		-0.210		0.098
		(0.069)		(0.223)		(0.078)

Age	0.011*	0.011*	0.012	0.013	0.002	0.003
	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.014)	(0.016)	(0.005)	(0.005)
Male	0.118	0.094	0.523	0.323	-0.062	-0.038
	(0.121)	(0.135)	(0.368)	(0.409)	(0.134)	(0.146)
Education (above secondary)	-0.209	-0.214	0.504	0.602	-0.305*	-0.335*
	(0.125)	(0.139)	(0.388)	(0.422)	(0.139)	(0.151)
Living as a couple	0.327*	0.302*	-0.030	0.135	-0.166	-0.195
	(0.127)	(0.138)	(0.390)	(0.424)	(0.147)	(0.158)
Children in household	0.087	0.137	0.275	0.195	0.062	0.085
	(0.079)	(0.085)	(0.247)	(0.277)	(0.085)	(0.092)
Household income above 1400	0.326**	0.348*	0.872*	0.872*	0.005	0.022
	(0.124)	(0.137)	(0.386)	(0.420)	(0.142)	(0.154)
Management/ ind. professional	0.211	0.266	0.239	0.177	0.123	0.067
	(0.139)	(0.157)	(0.440)	(0.487)	(0.155)	(0.170)
Religion	0.729***	0.693***	1.057**	1.151**	-0.145	-0.180
	(0.120)	(0.134)	(0.370)	(0.410)	(0.135)	(0.147)
Rich neighborhood	0.076***	0.059**	0.306***	0.264***	-0.012	-0.005
	(0.021)	(0.022)	(0.063)	(0.069)	(0.020)	(0.022)

(continue next page)

What determine beliefs? (continue)

	Fairness		Effectiveness		Need	
CRT	-0.137*	-0.115	-0.557**	-0.513*	-0.017	-0.003
	(0.066)	(0.074)	(0.193)	(0.215)	(0.072)	(0.079)
Math	-0.216*	-0.266**	-0.486	-0.215	0.012	-0.017
	(0.089)	(0.099)	(0.276)	(0.304)	(0.101)	(0.110)
Patience	0.039	0.032	0.074	0.060	-0.003	-0.004
	(0.028)	(0.030)	(0.086)	(0.091)	(0.030)	(0.032)
Observations	1368	1159	1368	1159	1368	1159

Standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Effectiveness, Fairness: OLS regression models

Need: Logit regression models

Our analysis sheds light on the significance of beliefs, which could explain the divergence from previous findings in the literature. In our sample, social preferences appear to correlate with voting tendencies or support for redistribution among citizens who believe that *luck is more important than merit*, that *public institutions can be trusted* to spend taxpayers' money effectively, and consider *poverty a central issue*. However, only 1.8% of our subjects hold these specific beliefs -just 25 subjects simultaneously fall into the first quartile of the luck (vs. effort) distribution, trust in government and concern about poverty. Therefore, given the small size of this subsample, it is very difficult for the fundamentals to significantly impact voting direction or support for redistribution. While our results do not rule out the possibility that in other populations under different belief systems, social preferences show an effect on political views, they do suggest that that certain belief conditions are necessary for this connection there may be necessary conditions concerning beliefs, for social preferences to be connected with support for redistribution and when those necessary conditions do not hold, social preferences are irrelevant for voting direction. Further research is needed to clarify the intricate relationship between beliefs, social preferences, and political stances on redistribution.

Our approach leaves out some details that may be important in reality. For example, we overlook the specific framing of the political proposals with redistributive implications, to focus solely on the trade-offs involved. We concentrate on the reactions to proposals impacting income distribution and efficiency. It's important to note that our results apply specifically to these particular trade-offs, abstracting away from realistic complexities. Nonetheless, we believe our findings offer valuable insights that could be further complemented in future research.

Overall, we believe our results have policy relevance because beliefs on the fairness, necessity and effectiveness of redistribution may be more amenable to change than the underlying social preferences. This, in turn, paves the way for further research aimed at designing interventions to shift those beliefs.

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A Appendix

A.1 Detailed information about the sample

Table S1: Summary statistics (n=1368)

	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Egalitarian	0.619	0.486	0	1
Altruist	0.265	0.441	0	1
Spiteful	0.070	0.256	0	1
Inequality seeker	0.048	0.214	0	1
Political views-Right	4.933	2.316	1	10
State intervention	7.570	2.093	1	10
Meritocracy beliefs (<i>fairness</i>)	6.648	2.120	1	10
Trust in institutions (<i>effectiveness</i>)	14.091	6.400	3	30
Poverty prevalence (<i>need</i>)	0.268	0.443	0	1
Age				
≤ 25	0.103	0.304	0	1
(25-45]	0.480	0.500	0	1
(45-65]	0.336	0.473	0	1
>65	0.081	0.273	0	1
Male	0.484	0.500	0	1
Education (above secondary)	0.592	0.491	0	1
Living as a couple	0.648	0.478	0	1
Children in household	0.540	0.807	0	5
Household income above 1400	0.443	0.497	0	1
Management/independent professional	0.243	0.429	0	1
Religion	0.357	0.479	0	1
Rich neighborhood	11.929	3.061	2	20
CRT	1.591	0.968	0	3
Math	1.247	0.711	0	2
Patience	3.453	2.068	0	6

Table S2: Variable definitions

Variable	Definition
Political views-Right	When talking about politics, the expressions left and right are commonly used. Here is a series of boxes from left to right. In which box would you place yourself according to your political views? 1 (left)- 10 (right)
State intervention	To what extent you agree or disagree with the following statement: "The State should take measures to reduce differences in income levels". 1 (Strongly disagree)- 10 (Strongly agree)
Meritocracy belief (<i>fairness</i>)	Some people think that people's economic position depends almost exclusively on their family background, contacts or simply the luck of their effort, education and professional worth. Others think that what really matters is effort, education and professional worth. On a scale of 1 to 10, where 1 is luck (family and contacts) and 10 is effort (education and worth), how much do you think effort influences the economic position achieved by people in Spain?
Trust in institutions (<i>effectiveness</i>)	Sum of these three questions: To what extent do you think you can trust local government institutions? 1 (very little)-10 (very much) To what extent do you think you can trust the autonomous government institutions? 1 (very little)-10 (very much) To what extent do you think you can trust national government institutions? 1 (very little)-10 (very much)
Poverty prevalence (<i>need</i>)	Dummy marking people that answer "Poverty, lack of food and drinking water" to this question: In your opinion, which of the following do you consider to be the most serious problem currently facing the world as a whole?
Age	Years old on your last birthday. Divide in several categories
Male	Dummy variable
Education (above secondary)	Dummy variable
Living as a couple	Dummy variable

Continues on next page

Variable definitions (continued)

Variable	Definition
Children in household	How many Children (under 14 years of age) live with you?
Household income above 1400	Household income is a variable divide in categories. This dummy variable signs households with income above the median interval
Management/ indep. professional	Dummy variable
Religion	Do you consider yourself a religious person? Dummy equals 1 if individual is a religious person
Rich neighborhood	Sum of these two variables: On a scale of 1 to 10, how would you rate your neighborhood when you were 8 years old? On a scale of 1 to 10, how would you rate your neighborhood when you were 15 years old? 1 means very poor, 10 means very rich
CRT	<i>CRT</i> is defined as the sum of correct answers in this three questions: (1) If you are running a race and you overtake the person in second place, what position are you in? (2) A farmer had 15 sheep and all but 8 died. How many sheep does he have left? (3) A new library is buying books for its collection. Each week the number of books in the library doubles. If it takes the library 36 weeks to complete the collection, how many weeks does it take to acquire half of the collection?
Math	<i>Math</i> is defined as the sum of correct answers in this two questions: (1) If there are 5 people holding the winning lottery ticket and the prize to be shared is two million euros, how much money will each person receive? (2) Suppose you have 100€ in a savings account. The account accrues an interest rate of 10% per year. How much money would you have in your account after two years?

Continues on next page

Variable definitions (continued)

Variable	Definition
Patience	Patience is measured using a multiple price list with six items of two options. The first one is always the same "collect tomorrow 100 euros". In the second options the waiting time for collection is one month and the amount increases by 10 euros form the firs question (which is 100 euros) to the sixth one (150 euros). We define <i>Patience</i> as the sum of times the respondent chooses option 2.

A.2 Motivations to choose B

Table S3: Potential motivations to choose Option B vs. (1, 1)

	Option B	Efficiency	Altruism	Selfishness	Spitefulness	Egalitarianism	Inequality seeking
D 1	(0.8, 1.6)	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	Yes
D 2	(1.2, 0.4)	No	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes
D 3	(1, 0.6)	No	No		Yes	No	Yes
D 4	(1.6, 0.4)		No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes
D 5	(1, 1.8)	Yes	Yes		No	No	Yes
D 6	(1.1, 1.9)	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes

A.3 Social preferences categorization

Figure S1: Social preferences categorization

	$\alpha \leq -0.25$ (D1=1)	$-0.25 \leq \alpha \leq 0$ (D1=0, D5=1)	$0 \leq \alpha \leq 0.125$ (D1=0, D5=0, D6=1)	$\alpha \geq 0.125$ (D1=0, D5=0, D6=0)
$\beta \leq 0$ (D3=1)	41	25	16	80
$0 \leq \beta \leq 0.25$ (D3=0, D2=1)	15	76	29	64
$0.25 \leq \beta \leq 0.5$ (D3=0, D2=0, D4=1)	20	36	17	27
$\beta \geq 0.5$ (D3=0, D2=0, D4=0)	54	161	68	639
	Inequality-seeking		Spitefulness	
	Altruism		Egalitarianism	

Note: $D_j=1$ if subject selects option B in decision j ; $D_j=0$ if subject selects option A in that decision. Each entry corresponds to the number of subjects with a given combination of parameters α (column) and β (row), e.g. there are 651 subjects with $\alpha \geq 0.125$ and $\beta \geq 0.5$.

Behind the Support for Redistributive Politics: Social Preferences or Beliefs?

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EXPERIMENTAL INSTRUCTIONS + SURVEY

(original instructions in Spanish)

CRT	2
Mini Dictator Games	3
Time Preferences	5
Risk Aversion	6
Survey	7

NOTE

The instructions shown in this document refer to the tasks studied in this paper (only). However, the experiment included additional tasks, specifically:

- a PGG experiment with 4 different treatments
- a task to assess ambiguity aversion
- a non-incentivized question about inequality aversion with 4 different treatments.

Anyone interested in seeing the complete instructions can find them here: <http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12412/3402>


CRT (Cognitive Reflection Test)

CRT1 If you are running a race and you overtake the person in second place, what position are you in? The answer is a number (a position in the ranking).

CRT2 A farmer had 15 sheep and all but 8 died. How many sheep does he have left? The answer is a number (of sheep).

CRT3 A new library is buying books for its collection. Each week the number of books in the library doubles. If it takes the library 36 weeks to complete the collection, how many weeks does it take to acquire half of the collection?

Mini Dictator Games:



In this task we will match you with another person participating in the survey. One of you will have the ability to decide for both of you. The other will simply be the receiver. You will be able to be a receiver or a decision maker with equal probability.

You are going to make 6 decisions about how to allocate amounts of money between you and your partner. Each decision consists of two options and you must choose one. The other person will receive the amount you send him/her and will never know your identity, nor will you know his/her identity.

To calculate the final amount of money we will roll a die and choose one of the 6 options (depending on the face of the die). For example, if it comes out 3 we will use your choice of row 3 to make the payments.

Subjects make 6 decisions in random order. The 6 choices are binary, and the A option is the equal distribution (1€ / 1€). The only variation appears in the B option



Now, you must choose one of the **two options**

- A 1€ for you / 1€ for the other person
- B 0.8€ for you / 1.6€ for the other person



Now, you must choose one of the **two options**

- A 1€ for you / 1€ for the other person
- B 1.2€ for you / 0.4€ for the other person



Now, you must choose one of the **two options**

- A 1€ for you / 1€ for the other person
- B 1€ for you / 1.8€ for the other person



Now, you must choose one of the **two options**

- A 1€ for you / 1€ for the other person
- B 1€ for you / 0.6€ for the other person



Now, you must choose one of the **two options**

- A 1€ for you / 1€ for the other person
- B 1.60€ for you / 0.4€ for the other person



Now, you must choose one of the **two options**

- A 1€ for you / 1€ for the other person
- B 1.1€ for you / 1.9€ for the other person

Time Preferences

Hipotéticamente, de las siguientes opciones
dinos cuál prefieres: la izquierda o la derecha

Cobrar mañana 100€	Cobrar 100€ en un mes
Cobrar mañana 100€	Cobrar 110€ en un mes
Cobrar mañana 100€	Cobrar 120€ en un mes
Cobrar mañana 100€	Cobrar 130€ en un mes
Cobrar mañana 100€	Cobrar 140€ en un mes
Cobrar mañana 100€	Cobrar 150€ en un mes



Among the following options, which one do you hypothetically prefer, the left or the right one?

The two options are always:

- “mañana” (tomorrow)
- “en un mes” (one month later)

The latter option varies from 100€ to 150€.

Risk Aversion

In a box there are 5 green apples and 5 red apples. If it comes out green you win 2€. If it comes out red you win nothing.

You have two options:

Participate in the task (you will win either 2€ if it comes out green or 0€ if it comes out red).

Or sell the task to someone else.

If you want to sell it you have to say at what price you want to sell it (between 0€ and 2€). Two things can happen:

- If the price you ask for is higher than what other person wants to pay **YOU KEEP IT.**
- If the price you ask for is the same as or less than what that person wants to pay, then you sell it and you keep the selling price.



SURVEY ON DECISION MAKING IN SPAIN

This survey is part of a scientific study carried out by researchers from Universidad Loyola Andalucía, Universidad Carlos III, and UPV. We are conducting a study on inequality in Spain. This survey is part of a project in collaboration with the Junta de Andalucía.

You have been selected as part of a sample in Spain. We would like to ask you some questions about your views on several issues. Your answers will be treated anonymously, but will serve to contribute to an improved understanding of decision making. You may withdraw your participation at any time without explanation.

The information obtained in this survey is protected by the provisions of the *Organic Law 3/2018 on the Protection of Personal Data and guarantee of digital rights*, which regulates the information in the collection of data, not being able to be treated or disseminated only in numerical and aggregate form, to ensure the anonymity of respondents

(New screen)

Next, we are going to ask you a few questions about yourself. Please answer each of them.

(New screen)

1. **Age** (years old on your last birthday).

2. Sex

- | | |
|---|---|
| Male | 1 |
| Female | 2 |
| I do not identify with any of the above ... | 3 |
| I prefer not to answer | 4 |

3. Where do you live?

Autonomous Community (drop down)

Province (drop down)

City: _____

Neighborhood: _____

Postal code: _____

4. Nationality

- | | |
|--------------------------------------|---|
| Spanish | 1 |
| Spanish but born outside Spain | 2 |

Other..... 3

Indicate which _____

5. Marital status

Single..... 1

Cohabitation/Domestic Partnership 2

Married (any rite) 3

Widowed 4

Divorced 5

Separated 6

NS/NC 9

6. What is the highest level of studies you have completed? (In case of studies in countries other than Spain use equivalent category)

1. Compulsory secondary education/EGB/elementary school or less
2. Intermediate vocational training or Baccalaureate/BUP/Higher Baccalaureate
3. FP higher grade
4. University (undergraduate)
5. University 2 (master's or PhD)

7. What is the highest level of education your parents completed? (In case of studies in countries other than Spain, use equivalent category).

	<u>7_1</u> Father	<u>7_2</u> Mother
Compulsory secondary education/EGB/elementary school or less	1	1
Intermediate vocational training or Baccalaureate/BUP/Higher Baccal	2	2
FP higher grade	3	3
University (undergraduate)	4	4
University 2 (master's or PhD)	5	5

8. How many people live with you? (here you should include all those who live in your household on a regular basis)

Adults (14 years old or older) ____ (drop down)

Children (under 14 years of age) ____ (drop down)

9. Which of the following situations are you currently in? (Multi-response)

- | | |
|--|----|
| Employee (Permanent contract) | 1 |
| Employee (Temporary contract).... | 2 |
| Unemployed worker without contract..... | 3 |
| Self-employed | 4 |
| Family business worker..... | 5 |
| Sick leave or maternity/paternity/paternity..... | 6 |
| Unemployed/..... | 7 |
| Retired or retired from work..... | 8 |
| Permanently disabled..... | 9 |
| Studying/taking training courses | 10 |

Performing unpaid social work, charitable activities 11
 ERTE..... 12
 Other situation (specify).....13
 NS/NC.....

10. In the last month your household received income from, (Multi-response)

- a. Wages
- b. Pensions
- c. Unemployment benefits
- d. Child, housing, sickness, scholarship and scholarship allowances
- e. Minimum Living Income or other regional minimum incomes.
- f. Other public aid
- g. Transfers from family, friends or organizations
- h. Business activities
- i. Self-employed professional activities
- j. Other income (sales, rents, dividends, interest, capital gains...)

11. Where did you live when you were 8 and 15 years old?

When I was 8 years old

City: _____

Neighborhood: _____

Postal code: _____

When I was 15 years old

City: _____

Neighborhood: _____

Postal code: _____

12. On a scale of 1 to 10, how would you rate this neighborhood?

When I was 8 years old

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
very poor					very rich				

When I was 15 years old

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
very poor					very rich				

13. Do you consider yourself a religious person?

Yes.....1

No.....2

If you answered 1 to question 13, → go to 13a and 13b.

If you answered 2 skip to question 14

13a. What religion do you profess?

Catholic.....1

Protestant.....2

Islam.....3

Jewish.....4

Other.....5

13b. With what intensity? On a scale of 1 to 10, where would you place yourself:

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
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very weak very strong

14. Please tell us to what extent you agree or disagree with the following statement: "*The State should take measures to reduce differences in income levels*".

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
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strongly disagree strongly agree

15. Some people think that people's economic position depends almost exclusively on their family background, contacts or simply the luck of their effort, education and professional worth. Others think that what really matters is effort, education and professional worth. On a scale of 1 to 10, where 1 is luck (family and contacts) and 10 is effort (education and worth), how much do you think effort influences the economic position achieved by people in Spain?

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	----

luck effort

16. On a scale of 1 to 10, to what extent are you willing to take risks in general?

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	----

very little very much

17. When talking about politics, the expressions left and right are commonly used. Here is a series of boxes from left to right. In which box would you place yourself according to your political views? Mark it with an X.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
left							right		

18. Can you tell us where your monthly household income is? (Net, after taxes).

- 0-499 € 1
- 500-699 € 2
- 700-899 € 3
- 900-1099 € 4
- 1100-1199 € 5
- 1200-1399 € 6
- 1400-1699 € 7
- 1700-1999 € 8
- 2000-2499 € 9
- More than 2500 € 10
- Don't know 88
- No answer 99

19. Which of the following categories best describes the industry in which you normally work?

- a. Agriculture, forestry, fishing and hunting
- b. Mining
- c. Construction
- d. Industry
- e. Trade
- f. Transportation and storage
- g. Software, telecommunications, information and data processing services
- h. Finance and Insurance
- i. Real Estate, Rental and Leasing
- j. University education
- k. Primary or secondary education
- l. Health and social assistance
- m. Arts, entertainment and recreation
- n. Hotel and gastronomic services
- o. Government and Public Administration
- p. Legal Services
- q. Scientific or technical services
- r. Household chores
- s. Military
- t. Religious
- u. Other industry

20. Which of the following best describes your job title?

- a. Senior Management
- b. Middle management

- c. Qualified worker
- d. Independent professional
- e. Administrative personnel
- f. Researcher
- g. Student
- h. Another

21. On a scale of 1 to 10 To **what extent do you feel you can trust other people you interact with in your daily life (family, friends, etc.)?**

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	----

very little very much

22. **To what extent do you think you can trust strangers you meet on the street?**

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	----

very little very much

23. **To what extent do you think you can trust local government institutions?**

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	----

very little very much

24. **To what extent do you think you can trust the autonomous government institutions?**

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	----

very little very much

25. **To what extent do you think you can trust national government institutions?**

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	----

very little very much

26. **In your opinion, which of the following do you consider to be the most serious problem currently facing the world as a whole?**

- a. Global warming
- b. International terrorism
- c. Poverty, lack of food and drinking water

- d. The spread of an infectious disease
- e. A major global economic downturn
- f. The proliferation of nuclear weapons
- g. Armed conflicts
- h. The increasing world population
- i. Other _____

27. On a scale of 1 to 10: How serious a problem do you think climate change is at the moment?

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	----

very low severity

extremely severe

28. Personally, do you think you are well informed or not about:

28.a The different causes of climate change

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	----

very little informed

very well informed

28.b The different consequences of climate change

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	----

very little informed

very well informed

28.c Ways in which we can fight climate change

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	----

very little informed

very well informed

29. In your opinion and on a scale of 1 to 10, are each of the following institutions currently doing too much (10), doing about the right amount (5), or not doing enough (1) to combat climate change?

29.a The national government

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	----

not doing enough

the right amount

too much

29.b The autonomous government

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
not doing enough				the right amount				too much	

29.c City Hall

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
not doing enough				the right amount				too much	

29.d The European Union

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
not doing enough				the right amount				too much	

29.e Corporations and industry

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
not doing enough				the right amount				too much	

29.f Citizens themselves

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
not doing enough				the right amount				too much	

30. For each of the following statements, express your level of agreement on a scale from 1 to 10

30.a Climate change is an unstoppable process; we cannot do anything about it.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
strongly disagree					strongly agree				

30.b The seriousness of climate change has been exaggerated.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
strongly disagree					strongly agree				

30.c Emission of CO2 (carbon dioxide) has only a minor impact on climate change.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
strongly disagree					strongly agree				

30.d Fighting climate change can have a positive impact on the European economy.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
strongly disagree					strongly agree				

30.e Alternative fuels, such as "biofuels", should be used to reduce greenhouse gas emissions.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
strongly disagree					strongly agree				

30.f You have personally taken actions aimed at helping fight climate change.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
strongly disagree					strongly agree				

31. Which of the following actions aimed at combating climate change have you personally taken? **Multi-response**

- You have purchased a car that consumes less fuel or is more environmentally friendly.
- You are reducing the use of your car, for example, by car-sharing or using your car more efficiently.
- You have chosen an environmentally friendly means of transportation (by foot, bicycle, public transport).
- You are reducing your consumption of energy at home (e.g., turning off air conditioning or heating, not leaving appliances on standby, buying energy-efficient products such as low-energy light bulbs or appliances).
- You are reducing your consumption of water at home (e.g., not leaving water running when washing the dishes, etc.).
- Whenever possible, you avoid taking short-haul flights.
- You have switched to an energy supplier or to a tariff that provides a higher share of energy from renewable sources than the previous one
- You are separating most of your waste for recycling
- You are reducing the consumption of disposable items (e.g. plastic bags, packaging, etc.).

- j. You buy local and seasonal products to avoid products that come from far away and therefore contribute to CO2 emissions (due to transportation).
- k. You have installed equipment in your own home that generates renewable energy (e.g., wind turbine, solar panels).

32. There are many reasons why people take action to combat climate change. Please tell us which of the following applies to you.

- a. You think that, if everyone changed their behavior, it will have a real impact on climate change.
- b. You think that it is your duty as a citizen to protect the environment
- c. You are very concerned about the world you will leave for the young and future generations.
- d. You think that taking these actions will save you money
- e. You have been directly exposed to the consequences of climate change.

33. There are many reasons that prevent people from taking action to combat climate change. Please tell us which of the following applies to you.

- a. You believe that changing your behavior will have no real impact on climate change.
- b. You believe that it is governments, companies and industries that need to change their behavior, not citizens.
- c. You would like to take action, but do not know what you can do to fight climate change.
- d. You think it would be too expensive to take actions that fight climate change.
- e. You are not concerned about climate change

34. Personally, how much extra would you be willing to pay each month on your electricity bill to have it produced from environmentally friendly sources to fight climate change?

----- euros (is a number between 0 and any positive)
